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Next: 5. Reconsidering Philosophical Foundations Up: 4. The Peculiarities of Previous: 4.3 Quantum Ontologies Subsections
Measurement by ConsciousnessesDifficulties with the Copenhagen Interpretation arise, Schrödinger and Wigner show, whenever living and/or conscious beings are included in the quantum formulation. For then these beings must be taken to be in a superposition of states, no matter how different these states may be, before the observer deigns to look at them. Schrödinger [1935] shows, in his `Schrödinger's Cat' example, that a cat can easily imagined in a superposition of alternatives, where in one alternative it is alive, and in another is dead. We find this difficult to believe. Wigner [1962] shows, similarly, when a conscious person (Wigner's friend) is included as part of the scientist's `apparatus', then the Cophenhagen Interpretation predicts that this person will be in superposition of distinct alternatives until the `real' observer interacts with him, by asking him a question, for example. We find this even more difficult to believe. Wigner resolves this difficulty by postulating that it is not merely the observing scientist which is responsible for the reduction of the wave packet, but any perceiving consciousness. This assumption at least has the advantage of not being anthropocentric with respect to the scientist. It is then presumably it is an empirical question whether Schrödinger's Cat has the necessary degree of consciousness to `reduce the wave packet' on its own, or whether it is sufficiently `unconscious' that it can be in a quantum superposition of distinct states of sensations.
One difficulty with this proposal is that it is not exactly clear what constitutes a `real split' of the wave function. Any quantum state can be analysed in terms of a momentum (or angular-momentum) distribution, for example, but is not clear whether that is a sufficient for there to be an actual splitting of the world (or world part). According to standard quantum mechanics, there is always some possibility (however remote it may be in practice) that two alternatives can be brought back together into some coherent combination. This means that in the many-worlds interpretation, we never really have many worlds, but really one `world set' which contains all the different `split worlds'. We therefore wonder whether all the branches should be regarded not as `equally actual', but as `equally potential' 4.11 , and still capable of remerging, in which case it becames much less clear what actually exists in the many-worlds interpretation. That intepretation becomes much less clear as a quantum ontology. What to do?The discovery of quantum phenomena has given rise to an enormous number of interpretational difficulties. A corresponding range of rather astonishing proposals for quantum ontologies have been proposed, in the attempt to try to understand quantum mechanics realistically. Next: 5. Reconsidering Philosophical Foundations Up: 4. The Peculiarities of Previous: 4.3 Quantum Ontologies Prof Ian Thompson 2003-02-25 |
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